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Organizational  decision  making  is  often  explored  with  theories  from  the  heuristics  and  biases research
program,  which  have  demonstrated  great  value  as descriptions  of how  people  in organizations  make
decisions.  Nevertheless,  rational  analysis  and  classical  probability  theory  are  still  seen  by  many  as  the
best  accounts  of  how  decisions  should  be  made  and  classical  probability  theory  is  the preferred  frame-
work  for  cognitive  modeling  for many  researchers.  The  focus  of  this  work  is  quantum  probability  theory,
an  alternative  probabilistic  framework.  Results  in  decision  making,  which  appear  paradoxical  from  a
perspective  of  classical  probability  theory,  may  make  perfect  sense  if  one  adopts  quantum  probability
theory.  We  review  some  cognitive  models  of decision  making  based  on  quantum  probability  theory.  Eachonjunction effect
nterference effects
of these  models  is  based  on  a  challenge  to  prescription  from  classical  probability  theory.  The  transition
from  labeling  a  particular  behavior  as irrational,  by  classical  probability  standards,  to  (potentially)  ratio-
nal (or,  at  any  rate,  not  fallacious),  raises  interesting  possibilities,  including  that of characterizing  certain
heuristics  in  formal,  probabilistic  terms.
©  2014  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.  Published  by Elsevier  Inc.  This  is an
en  acop
. Introduction
In psychology, the classical rational model of decision making
ssumes that decision makers comprehensively deﬁne a problem,
nderstand all possible alternatives and their consequences, and
elect the very best action after evaluating all the available options
e.g., Anderson, 1991; March, 1997; Simon, 1979). Moreover, all
robabilistic computations are assumed to be carried out in a way
hich conforms to the prescription from classical probability (CP)
heory. The link between rationality and CP theory can be justiﬁed
n important a priori ways, such as the Dutch Book argument (e.g.,
owson & Urbach, 1993), which shows that CP reasoning is consis-
ent/coherent, in a certain formal sense (Oaksford & Chater, 2009;
enenbaum, Kemp, Grifﬁths, & Goodman, 2011).
Yet many researchers have questioned the relevance of the clas-
ical rational model and CP theory in modeling human decision
aking, especially in the case of applied decision making situa-
ions (see also, e.g., Wakker, 2010, for arguments relating to risk
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 07812 341048; fax: +44 01792 295679.
E-mail addresses: l.c.white.517813@swansea.ac.uk (L.C. White),
mmanuel.pothos.1@city.ac.uk (E.M. Pothos), jbusemey@indiana.edu
J.R. Busemeyer).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.11.002
211-3681/© 2014 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).cess  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
and loss aversion). The focus of the present article is organiza-
tional decision making. In such cases, decision makers are often
assumed to have limited cognitive resources and are faced with
environments which are uncertain, complex, and go beyond the
assumptions and manipulations of laboratory-based decision tasks.
As a result, it has been argued that decision makers operate within
the limits of ‘bounded rationality’, frequently ‘satisﬁcing’ by making
good enough decisions (Simon, 1955) and adapting to their envi-
ronment by using heuristics and intuition, which can both enhance
(e.g., Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 1991; Klein, 1998) and
bias decision making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Kahneman,
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Moreover, working in complicated, often
emotionally charged, organizational systems, decision makers have
to respond to the needs of multiple stakeholders, who can politi-
cally inﬂuence the decision making process (e.g., Cyert & March,
1963; March & Simon, 1958; Pfeffer, 1981) and both inﬂuence and
are inﬂuenced by the context and the situated, embodied aspects
of cognition, in which the decision is being made (e.g., Niedenthal,
Barsalou, Winkielman, Karuth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Weick, 1995;
Wheeler, 2005).All these are considerations which undermine the descriptive
adequacy of CP theory decision making models and the rational
analysis approach, in situations of applied decision making. Be that
as it may, for many researchers, rational analysis still provides the
 Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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rescription for how decision makers should reason, on the basis
f the available information. We  think this normative aspect of
rescription from CP models in a given situation is particularly sig-
iﬁcant, especially in the case of applied decision making, where,
learly, there is an extra onus to ensure that decisions are as ‘cor-
ect’ as possible. Relatedly, because of this point, it is the case that
any researchers still ﬁnd appealing cognitive modeling on the
asis of CP principles (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2009), despite the
vidence that, in many practical situations, modeling approaches
ased on e.g., heuristics and biases may  have a higher descriptive
alue (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 1991; Kahneman &
versky, 1996; Kahneman et al., 1982).
It is these points which motivate the approach in the present
rticle, based on quantum probability (QP) theory. QP theory is a
ormal framework for how to assign probabilities to events, and
o it is possible to develop some normative arguments for QP the-
ry, analogous to those for CP theory (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2014).
qually, some processes in QP theory appear to have natural inter-
retations in terms of existing, well-known heuristics, such as
he representativeness or availability heuristics (cf. Busemeyer &
ruza, 2012; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013). It is then possible that
P theory can provide a perspective on organizational decision
aking, which is close to descriptive assumptions from relevant
euristics and biases and, equally, consistent with the general, a
riori arguments, which motivate CP accounts and corresponding
ormative considerations. Our speciﬁc objective is to provide some
reliminary discussion of whether such an exciting (though, also,
mbitious) objective might be achievable or not.
Many of the decision making phenomena that have been stud-
ed as part of the QP research program concern situations for
hich the normative (from CP theory) prescription goes against a
ery strong intuition for an alternative decision. Intuition has been
eﬁned as “affectively-charged judgments that arise through rapid,
on-conscious, and holistic associations” (Dane & Pratt, 2007:
0). Intuition is seen as important in the use of heuristics (e.g.,
ahneman & Tversky, 1982; Klein, 1998, 2003), produces decisions
hat can at times appear irrational, at least without detailed anal-
sis (e.g., Klein, 1998), and as a process is itself difﬁcult to explain
ationally (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Both CP theory and QP theory are, in
art, intended as theories for how intuitions regarding the relative
ikelihood of different possibilities develop. While the work just
ited indicates a divergence between predictions from CP models
nd current understanding about intuition, a consideration of QP
heory can lead to alternative conclusions.
QP theory was devised to explain paradoxical ﬁndings in quan-
um physics that could not be understood using classical theories. It
s based on axioms fundamentally different from those of CP theory
nd so corresponding probabilistic inference involves character-
stics (such as superposition, incompatibility, and entanglement),
ith no analogs in classical theory. It has helped physicists under-
tand, for example, how different events within a system interfere
ith one another and how the measurement of a system inﬂuences
he state of the system. Such phenomena are also observed in deci-
ion making research, for example, in relation to order effects (e.g.,
ogarth & Einhorn, 1992) and the constructive role that making a
hoice can have on underlying preferences (e.g., Payne, Bettman, &
ohnson, 1993; Sharot, Velasquez, & Dolan, 2010). So, proponents
f the application of QP theory in cognition have argued that these
pecial characteristics of QP align well with human decision mak-
ng under uncertainty, at least under some circumstances. In fact,
uman decision making behavior, which may  appear paradoxical
r irrational from a classical perspective, often has a simple and nat-
ral explanation in terms of QP principles. Of relevance is also the
act that, in QP theory, the incompatibility of certain possibilities
eans that their probabilistic computation needs to be sequential,
o that, for example, even conjunctions need to be assessed in aMemory and Cognition 4 (2015) 229–238
sequential way. Such requirements make QP theory computation
closer to process assumptions and so, perhaps, more suitable for
modeling the situations of applied decision making that we are
interested in. In general, it has been suggested that incorporat-
ing process assumptions into cognitive models is an appropriate
direction for their development (Jones & Love, 2011; cf. Newell,
1990).
The structure of our contribution in this Special Issue is as
follows: ﬁrst, we will brieﬂy summarize QP theory and consider
the motivation for exploring its application in cognitive model-
ing. It is not our intention to provide a comprehensive overview
of QP theory research, for reviews see, for example, Busemeyer and
Bruza (2012), Khrennikov (2010), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013)
and Wang, Busemeyer, Atmanspacher, and Pothos (2013). Second,
we will consider some of the key insights about human deci-
sion making, from existing QP cognitive models, as developed in
the context of particular empirical applications (mostly based on
Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood
& Busemeyer, 2011; Wang & Busemeyer, 2013). The selection
of empirical applications will be motivated from corresponding
conclusions that human behavior deviates from the prescription
of CP theory. Of course, there are often typically powerful non-
CP theory accounts for such ﬁndings (e.g., Gigerenzer & Selten,
2001; Marewski & Schooler, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
The emphasis on CP theory relates to the emphasis on normative
considerations in this paper. As discussed, we  think that this is a
valuable approach, especially in situations of applied signiﬁcance,
where decision makers may  be particularly keen to achieve deci-
sions considered ‘correct’ in some formal sense (since deviations
from normative prescription may  lead to e.g., material loss). For
each of these insights/applications, we  discuss the new perspec-
tive that QP provides on organizational decision making and the
possible implications and beneﬁts. That is, our discussion will be
more focused on the normative perspective (conﬂicts with CP the-
ory and corresponding QP theory insights), less so by the descriptive
or bounded rationality perspective, provided by models based on
heuristics and biases (though, obviously, both perspectives are
valuable).
Inevitably, some of the recommendations in this paper, in rela-
tion to QP theory, will involve speculation. Our work so far has
focused on establishing the formal validity of QP  cognitive mod-
els, against empirical results of high prominence in the decision
making literature. There has been little systematic investigation
or empirical research into the applicability of QP models in orga-
nizational settings (for exceptions see the work of Lawless and his
colleagues discussing how principles of QP can be applied to model-
ing social dynamics, such as cooperation and competition, in teams
and organizations; Lawless & Sofge, 2012; Lawless & Grayson, 2003;
Lawless, Bergman, Louc¸ ã, Kriegel, & Feltovich, 2007; Lawless et al.,
2011; see also Yukalov & Sornette, 2012, who  apply their quan-
tum decision theory (Yukalov & Sornette, 2008), a theory developed
for individual personal decision making, to decision makers under
the inﬂuence of other social agents). We  hope that this paper can
serve to inspire further work toward an applied direction for the QP
cognition program, in relation to organizational decision making.
The ideas we outline below provide an alternative perspective for
rationality and optimality in probabilistic inference and motivate
a discussion of implications (and possible aids) in organizational
decision making.
2. An outline of quantum probability theoryQP theory is a theory for how to assign probabilities to events. It
is best known in its application to physics, in the context of quan-
tum mechanics. But, the rules regarding probabilistic assignment
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n quantum mechanics (what we call QP theory) have no essential
hysical content and can, in principle, be applied in any situation,
here there is a need to formalize uncertainty. Well known applica-
ions of quantum theory outside physics are in information theory
e.g., Nielsen & Chuang, 2010) and information retrieval (e.g., Van
ijsbergen, 2004; Widdows, 2004).
The application of QP theory in psychology has been gain-
ng momentum in recent years and spans a range of cognitive
esearch themes, such as conceptual combination (e.g., Aerts, 2009;
erts & Gabora, 2005), similarity (Pothos, Busemeyer, & Trueblood,
013), memory (e.g., Bruza, Kitto, Nelson, & McEvoy, 2009), and
erception (Atmanspacher & Filk, 2010). In decision making the-
ry, note that, within the QP theory community, a number of
ifferent modeling approaches have been adopted (e.g., Aerts &
erts, 1995; Basieva & Khrennikov, 2014; Bordley & Kadane, 1999;
ordley, 1998; Busemeyer, Pothos, Franco, & Trueblood, 2011;
hrennikov & Haven, 2009; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Zamir, & Zwirn,
009; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011;
ang & Busemeyer, 2013; Yukalov & Sornette, 2008, 2009). We  do
ot review these approaches in detail (for overviews organized in
ingle volumes see Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Khrennikov, 2010,
nd the special issue of Topics in Cognitive Science, Wang et al.,
013). Instead, we focus on examples of models which we  think
rovide simple illustrations of the main principles underlying QP
ognitive accounts of decision making generally and the implica-
ions these have for organizational decision making.
The use of QP theory in psychology has enabled the introduction
f several novel theoretical concepts. One new concept is that, in
P theory, certain questions are considered incompatible, mean-
ng that certainty for one requires (ontic) uncertainty for the other.
he idea of incompatibility is related to the existence of uncertainty
elations; that is, the requirement that the combined uncertainty
or particular pairs of questions can never be reduced below a min-
mum level. Another new concept is that a person’s knowledge can
e characterized as a superposition state, with respect to particular
uestions, which means that precise values for the corresponding
uestions do not exist, until a measurement is made. Finally, in
P theory cognitive states can be entangled, so that corresponding
easurements may  result in super-correlations, not possible in CP
heory.
A lot of the strangeness of QP theory arises because events are
epresented as subspaces in a multidimensional vector space, called
 Hilbert space.1 By contrast, events in CP theory are subsets of a
ample space. Greatly oversimplifying, the difference between QP
nd CP theory is one between a geometric representation of prob-
bilities vs. a set-theoretic representation one. The implication of
his difference is that the structure of events in CP theory is that of a
oolean algebra, but in QP theory it is only a partial Boolean algebra,
eaning that, in the latter, operations like conjunction or disjunc-
ion are not deﬁned for all possible pairs of possibilities (Hughes,
989).
We  aim to present our examples below, as much as possible,
ith little mathematical detail. So, we here discuss only the very
asic aspects of how probabilities are assigned to events in QP the-
ry (e.g., Isham, 1989). Consider the mental state of a participant,
.g., when contemplating which of two options to choose. This
ental state is represented as a vector in a Hilbert space. Then, dif-
erent events or choices for the relevant situation are represented
s subspaces in the Hilbert space. Such subspaces can have any
imensionality. A fundamental assumption in QP theory is that the
robability that the state is consistent with a particular event is the
quared length of the projection onto the corresponding subspace.
1 Hilbert spaces are vector spaces deﬁned on a complex ﬁeld endowed with an
nner product, and having certain convergence properties as well.Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 229–238 231
Note, this means that mutually exclusive events have to be at right
angles with each other. Incompatible events are represented as
subspaces at oblique angles, relative to each other, such that the
smaller the angle, the higher the classical correlation between
these possibilities. Finally, if a person observes that an event is true,
then a new cognitive state is formed by projecting the current state
onto the subspace of the observed event. This is the “infamous”
state reduction or “collapse” that occurs in quantum theory. We
do not wish to discuss the mathematics of QP theory any further at
this point, but rather ﬂesh out some of the underlying principles,
as this becomes relevant in the examples below.
3. Strategic decision making and incompatibility
Strategic decisions are characterized as being novel, ambigu-
ous, complex, open-ended (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret,
1976), and inﬂuenced by a diverse range of interacting social, emo-
tional and political factors (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Eisenhardt &
Zbaracki, 1992; March & Simon, 1958;Pfeffer, 1981; Tetlock, 1985).
For example, if a decision maker is required to look at which new
production technology they should invest in, he or she will need
to consider objective information about the competing systems,
alongside the different views held by stakeholders about the cost
of the investment, the quality of the new technology and the time it
will take to get production up and running. These various consider-
ations represent distinct rationales which, depending on the power
and social inﬂuence of the stakeholders, can diverge or overlap (e.g.,
Janis, 1972; Langley, 1995). This type of loosely structured context
is said to foster the use of intuition in decision making (e.g., Klein,
1998; Shapiro & Spence, 1997). During the course of the decision
making process, the various inputs may  interact with one another,
so that, for example, if the decision maker is certain that quality is an
important factor, then perhaps their feelings about the importance
of cost or time to production become less certain.
From a cognitive modeling point of view, the idea that the inter-
action of different cognitive events (e.g., a thought or a feeling)
might inﬂuence a decision maker’s intuition and ﬁnal judgment is
quite plausible and can be illustrated by the conjunction fallacy,
one of the most famous phenomena studied in the heuristics-
and-biases program. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) presented to
participants a short vignette about a hypothetical person, Linda,
who was described very much as a feminist, but not a bank teller.
Then, participants were asked to rank order a set of statements
about Linda. The critical statements were (1) that Linda is a bank
teller (BT) and (2) that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist (BT & F).
Participants ranked the latter as more probable than the former,
hence indicating that they considered Prob(BT&F) > Prob(BT), a
result that is called the conjunction fallacy. Since Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1983) seminal study, the conjunction fallacy has been
frequently replicated with many other kinds of stimuli and exper-
imental situations (though see e.g., Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999).
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) argued that the conjunction fal-
lacy arises because Linda is very similar to the typical feminist, so
that she is likely to be considered a probable bank teller and a femi-
nist. It was suggested that this representativeness heuristic is what
guides decision making and that, indeed, CP theory has nothing to
do with cognition (at least in such cases). The conjunction fallacy is
very hard to reconcile with a CP prescription, because CP theory is
based on set theory and a single sample space for all events; a more
speciﬁc event can never be more probable than an inclusive, more
general one. Put differently, the hypothetical Lindas who  are both F
and BT can never be more numerous than the ones who are just BT.
There have been, of course, explanations of the conjunction fallacy
based on, e.g., heuristics (including Tversky & Kahneman’s, 1983,
one). However, as discussed, our emphasis here is the perspective
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rom formal probability theory. If CP theory is considered a norma-
ive standard, and decision makers commit the conjunction fallacy,
oes that mean that it is incorrect to use a heuristic in this situation
nd instead is it more desirable to pursue correctives? The applica-
ion of QP theory in the problem can help inform this key question.
The relationship between variables in decision making and the
equence in which they are considered, lies at the heart of incom-
atibility, one of the key concepts of QP. Bohr (1928), an early
ioneer of quantum theory, introduced the concept. Interestingly,
here is some evidence that Bohr may  have been inﬂuenced by the
ork of James (1890a,b), who had considered these issues from
 psychological perspective (Holton, 1970). In quantum theory,
wo observables or measurements which are non-commuting (e.g.,
osition and momentum) are said to be incompatible. When mea-
urements are incompatible they are subject to order effects so that
easuring in one order may  produce results different to measur-
ng in a different order, AB /= BA. This is different from classical
bservables, which have to obey the law of commutativity in con-
unctions (e.g., AB = BA). As observables in quantum theory are both
roperties of and operations on the state of the system, they can
lso be considered actions (Wang et al., 2013). This means that the
ffect of a given action sequence on an initial state will depend on
he order in which those actions occur.
Busemeyer et al. (2011) have shown how a QP model can provide
 natural account for the conjunction fallacy. The key assumption
as that the possibilities that Linda is an F and, separately, a BT,
re incompatible, so that they cannot be assessed concurrently.
herefore, the conjunction BT&F does not exist and, instead, one
eeds to evaluate the sequential conjunction BT& then F or F &
hen BT (Busemeyer et al., 2011, argued that the latter is more cog-
itively plausible). How does the QP model work? For incompatible
uestions, establishing the answer for one changes the perception
or answering the other. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment can
e strongly order and context dependent. Thus, for example, from
he perspective of the initial story about Linda, she is extremely
nlikely to be a BT. But, once participants have accepted the F
roperty for Linda, then it is easier to recognize that feminists can
ave all sorts of professions. From this feminist perspective, it is
asier to accept the possibility that Linda might be a BT (in both
ases, ‘easier’ is relative to how easy it is to accept the possibility
hat Linda might be a BT, from the baseline perspective of just the
tory).
Translating this example into an applied context, strategic
ecisions that concern signiﬁcant organizational change might
llustrate how ‘committing’ the conjunction fallacy can make sense.
n such situations, decision makers can be emotionally attached to
xisting strategies (e.g., Finkelstein, Whitehead & Campbell, 2008)
nd it is argued that, in order to change, decision makers need to
oosen their emotional commitment (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000;
odgkinson & Healey, 2011; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Resis-
ance to change can be a product of the perceived threat that the
hanges pose to social identities (e.g., Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000;
aslam, Eggins, & Reynolds, 2003; Hogg & Terry, 2000). The ability
f an organization to manage how its employees affectively react
o organizational changes that impact on their social identity (e.g.,
odgkinson & Healey, 2011) and respond to the collective emo-
ions of the organization (e.g., Huy, 1999, 2002) can be critical in
he success of change initiatives. Having people make decisions that
un contrary to their existing perceptions of their organization is
ifﬁcult; large changes in identity are perceived as unattainable
nd small changes are perceived as irrelevant (Reger, Gustafon,
emarie, & Mullane 1994). One way through this is by exploiting
he principles of QP, as demonstrated in the explanation of the con-
unction fallacy, that the conjunction of two events can increase
he probability of making a decision in a given direction, because
ccepting a more probable event can facilitate the acceptance ofMemory and Cognition 4 (2015) 229–238
a less probable one (assuming the two events are linked, in some
way).
Consider a new CEO of a manufacturing company. Strategically,
she thinks that she needs to change the positioning of the company,
to being more technologically advanced. Doing so will both increase
the efﬁciency of production and also convey the right image of
the organization to customers and shareholders that is needed to
succeed in the future. The board needs to decide in favor of this
change in strategic direction, but, historically, investment in new
technology has not been a priority for this company and so the
probability of them deciding to pursue it is low. Are there any con-
ditions under which the board might decide to support the CEO’s
favored strategy?
Consider next an alternative approach the CEO could adopt. She
suggests that strategically the organization needs to re-position
itself as a more environmentally friendly ﬁrm, at the forefront
of ensuring high environmental standards, which are increasingly
favored by customers and subject to government guidelines and
regulations. This argument might be easier to make, as it resonates
with the importance of maintaining a revenue stream. Having made
this argument and convinced the board, it might then become
easier to persuade them to invest in new technology to improve
efﬁciency, thereby making their production processes more envi-
ronmentally friendly. Depending on the information presented
and, critically, the sequence in which it is presented, the prob-
ability of the board selecting the CEO’s preferred approach may
be increased, in a way  analogous to how the conjunction fallacy
emerges. In other words, this is a case whereby the probabil-
ity of a single change (being technologically advanced) is lower
than the probability of a (quantum) conjunction (being environ-
mentally friendly and then being technologically advanced; note,
the quantum model predictions regarding the emergence of the
conjunction fallacy are order-dependent, in relation to the consid-
eration of the premises; Busemeyer et al., 2011). Having accepted
the change in relation to being environmentally friendly, it becomes
more plausible to accept the further change of being technolog-
ically advanced – the ﬁrst change has a facilitatory effect on the
second one, because the two share a causal connection. For this
to be the case, the two changes have to be ‘incompatible’ (in
the quantum sense) and, moreover, one change (which we can
call the facilitatory change) has to make the target change one
more plausible. Finally, clearly, facilitation can occur only if the
changes are carried out in a certain order, from facilitatory to tar-
get.
This example from organizational decision making demon-
strates how an explanation in formal terms can be provided by
QP theory for a decision which, so far, could only be explained in
heuristic terms. Of course, there are alternative explanations, for
why, in the above example, the probability of the board accept-
ing the proposal is inﬂuenced by the conjunction of those two
particular options. For example, resistance may  be diminished by
linking one aspect of the change that does accord with peoples’
social identity (being environmental friendly) with another aspect
that does not (being technologically advanced). This and other
perspectives can help elaborate the relevant cognitive processes.
But, the conjunction fallacy has been labeled a fallacy because
it does not make sense in terms of a normative perspective on
decision making, based on CP theory. But, it is fully consistent
with QP theory, an alternative formal probabilistic framework,
which raises the question of whether the conjunction fallacy should
really be considered a fallacy at all. The application of QP  the-
ory so helps elucidate the key question of normative guidance
that we are interested in and it also demonstrates how the novel
theoretical concepts in QP theory (in this case incompatibility)
can help increase our understanding of human decision mak-
ing.
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. Uncertainty, organizational change and violations of the
aw of total probability
Organizational inertia, the tendency of businesses, especially
hose at the maturity phase of the lifecycle, to continue operat-
ng in the same way, is an issue facing many organizations as they
ake decisions about strategy. Inertia typically precedes decline for
any businesses, especially incumbent businesses facing the entry
f new players in their markets, unless attempts are made to over-
ome their rigidity (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Tushman
 Anderson, 1986). Such businesses demonstrate an apathy and
eluctance toward change, preferring to stick with their established
pproaches (Miller & Friesen, 1980; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985)
nd defending previous decisions, in spite of evidence that demon-
trates their failure (Staw, 1976; Staw & Ross, 1987). The difﬁculty
f organizational change in this situation is often due to the strength
f emotional attachment to previous strategies and the threat that
he changes pose to self-esteem (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000;
inkelstein et al., 2008; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Teece et al.,
997; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). As Lewin (1951) argued, if peo-
le are happy with the status quo, regardless of what internal or
xternal triggers for organizational change exist, there is no impe-
us for them to change.
From the perspective of modeling cognitive processes in
ecision making, this situation reﬂects what we will call the
total probability trap’. The law of total probability is a funda-
ental principle in the mathematical structure of CP theory
nd is illustrated by the sure-thing principle described by Savage
1954). Savage demonstrated his principle using as an exam-
le, a familiar scenario in organizational decision making, a
eliberation regarding a strategic investment. A business exec-
tive is contemplating investing in a property and he believes
he outcome of the next American presidential election to be
ritical to the decision. After asking whether he would invest
f a Democrat or Republican won the election and concluding
hat he would invest regardless of who won, the executive con-
ludes that he should invest, even though he is uncertain about the
utcome of the election. Note, according to the sure thing principle,
rob(invest) = Prob(invest|republicn)·Prob(republican) + Prob(invest|
emocrate)·Prob(democrate), so that Prob(invest) is bound by
rob(invest|republican) and Prob(invest|democrate). So, if the agent
hinks he should be behaving rationally (a reasonable assump-
ion!), then he may  feel compelled to invest in the unknown
ase, in a way  consistent with the law of total probability. This
equirement clearly constrains possible behavior, but, as the
ollowing example shows, people’s decision making is not always
onstrained by the law of total probability.
Shaﬁr and Tversky (1992) provided an ingenious test of whether
uman decision making is consistent with the law of total proba-
ility. They had participants play a prisoner’s dilemma game. As is
tandard in such games, there were two possible actions, defect (D)
nd cooperate (C) and two players, which, in Shaﬁr and Tversky’s
xperiment were the participant in the experiment and a hypo-
hetical opponent. The combination of the action of the participant
nd the hypothetical opponent determined the payoff to both. The
ayoffs were set up in such a way, that no matter what the hypo-
hetical opponent did, it was advantageous for the participant to
. Shaﬁr and Tversky’s (1992) experiment involved some so-called
onus trials, in which the participant was told of the opponent’s
ction. Predictably enough, when a typical participant was told that
he opponent chose to D, she would D as well; likewise, when she
as told the opponent chose to C, by far the most common action
as to D. The surprising ﬁnding was that, when the opponent’s
ction was unknown, many participants reversed their action and
hose to C. Thus, Shaﬁr and Tversky (1992) showed that Prob(D,
nknown) /= Prob(D∧known D) + Prob(D∧known C), so violating theMemory and Cognition 4 (2015) 229–238 233
law of total probability. Since this pioneering study, several other
analogous results have been reported (e.g., Busemeyer, Wang, &
Mogiliansky-Lambert, 2009; Croson, 1999).
The intuition about the psychological process in Shaﬁr and
Tversky’s (1992) experiment is that there are perhaps good reasons
for defecting under each of the ‘known’ conditions. For example,
when a participant knows the opponent cooperates, it makes sense
to choose to D, so as to make more money. When a participant
knows the opponent defects, a D action makes sense, as retribution.
But, these two  reasons to D fail to come to mind in the unknown
condition. It is as if, when there is uncertainty, these individually
good reasons to D interfere with each other, that is, cancel each
other out.
Regarding Shaﬁr and Tversky’s (1992) experimental situation,
the classical prescription is straightforward. If you do action A,
given X and you do action A, given ∼X, then you should do action
A, regardless of whether you know about X or not. Pothos and
Busemeyer (2009) showed how a quantum model for Shaﬁr and
Tversky’s (1992) experimental situation reproduces the observed
violations of the law of total probability (related applications are
in Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011; Wang & Busemeyer, 2013). What
this means is that, although according to CP theory it is wrong to
violate the law of total probability, according to QP theory, given
that a person chooses action A, given X and, separately, given ∼X,
then it can be correct (in the sense of probabilistic prescription
from QP theory) to reverse his/her decision and do ∼A, in a situa-
tion where there is uncertainty about X. Note, it is not the case that
a person should reverse action in the situation of unknown informa-
tion, rather that, according to QP theory (and contrary to CP theory),
consistency of action with the individual known conditions is not
required.
So as with our discussion of the conjunction fallacy, we ask are
there situations in organizational decision making where breaking
the law of total probability might make sense? Take, for example,
a large, mature organization which has a newly hired, enthusiastic
marketing manager, who thinks that there is a need to re-energize
and promote a brand with a new marketing campaign in order to
increase sales revenue. A new campaign carries risk, until it has
been tried and tested. Why  should decision makers sanction a trial?
If our marketing manager argues that the existing marketing cam-
paign (A) does not generate the level of sales that the product should
be achieving (∼X), decision makers in an organization suffering
from inertia may  still reject the marketing manager’s proposal. For
example, they may  be emotionally committed to the existing cam-
paign, they may  feel that they have made a signiﬁcant investment,
and, ﬁnally, that the current approach is at least generating some
revenue. Thus, they may  elect to continue with the existing cam-
paign (A). If the existing campaign (A) is generating an acceptable
level of sales (X), then they will elect to continue anyway. Psycho-
logically they may  be suffering from the sunk cost fallacy (Arkes &
Blumer, 1985) and may  also fear reputational risk to themselves, if
the new campaign fails. And of course there may also be other social,
emotional and political forces at work (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011;
Teece et al., 1997; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) that are helping to
maintain the status quo. At this point, with this example, all we
have done is point out that an undesirable action, A, is likely to be
adopted under both circumstances X and circumstances ∼X. Clas-
sically, by the law of total probability, the normative prescription
requires us to adopt A, even when knowledge about X is lacking.
Some heuristic approaches, such as the failure of consequen-
tial reasoning principle in Shaﬁr and Tversky’s (1992) research,
provide a descriptive account of violations of the law of total prob-
ability. However, such accounts do not allow us to overturn the
interpretation of fallaciousness, which is the classically required
characterization of violations of the law of total probability. We
have argued that this is important, especially in situations in which
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here is a requirement for decision making to conform to a nor-
ative standard, that is, in situations in which reasoning has to be
onsidered correct. But, if QP theory can be applied in the situa-
ion of interest, then decision makers can, correctly, reverse their
ction, when there is uncertainty about the critical information.
he QP theory formulation resonates with Lewin’s (1951) classic 3
tep metaphor for change. The ﬁrst step, unfreezing, involves the
eduction of forces that are maintaining stability and introducing
ore uncertainty so that changes can be made.
In the case of our marketing manager, this means that he should
ot refer to the revenues associated with the existing campaign
nd whether or not they are acceptable. He might discuss alterna-
ive reasons, but, he should maintain uncertainty about the critical
nformation. With an absence of the contextual information that is
esponsible for making people reach identical decisions, this allows
or the possibility that reverse decisions will be made and a viola-
ion of the law of total probability. Note that, the standard intuition
s that decisions should be made on the basis of availability of
ll necessary information; uncertainty generated by an absence of
nformation would not be considered optimal or desirable. This is
ot to say that people can manage uncertainty in an optimal way.
ndeed, people are generally uncertainty averse (Ellsberg, 1961;
pstein, 1999; Fox & Tversky, 1995) and uncertainty is regarded as
n aversive state that people are motivated to reduce (e.g., Hirsch,
ar, & Peterson, 2012; Hogg, 2000; Weary & Edwards, 1996).
With the above thoughts in mind, one way to understand the
P formulation in more psychological terms is that perhaps con-
extual information anchors or forces the decision making process
nto inevitable directions. However, feelings of uncertainty have
een shown to prolong positive moods and stimulate curiosity
Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Kurtz, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2007;
ilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005). The absence of infor-
ation, then, allows for additional perspectives in decision making
nd ﬂexibility in thinking.
. Organizational decision making and order effects
The complexity of real-life, organizational decisions means that
ecision makers frequently have to consider various pieces of infor-
ation processed in a particular sequence. Different factors, such
s social inﬂuence, politics or organizational procedures may  deter-
ine the sequencing of information in the decision making process.
or example, organizations often have to make decisions about
heir personnel as part of their selection and performance appraisal
rocedures. These types of decisions have been shown to be sus-
eptible to the effects of interference between different variables in
he decision making process (Highhouse, 1996, 2008; Thorsteinson,
reier, Atwell, Hamilton, & Privette, 2008). In assessment centers,
hich represent a common way of selecting new employees, con-
rast effects have been demonstrated, when there is a difference in
erformance levels between candidates, such that one candidate’s
erformance can be rated as poor or strong depending on the per-
ormance of other candidates in the same exercise, even when the
arget candidate’s performance is no different in either situation
e.g., Gaugler & Rudolph, 1992). Similarly, in performance appraisal,
he procedures by which organizations evaluate employees can
e subject to order effects generated by contrasting variations in
erformance between different employees (e.g., Palmer, Maurer, &
eldman, 2002).
The cognitive processes underlying such decision making can
e viewed as heuristic processes taking place under conditions of
ncertainty (Reb, Greguras, Luan, & Daniels, 2014). In particular, the
rder in which information is processed and decisions are made can
nﬂuence the outcome. A study by Moore (2002), using Gallup polls,
rovides a good illustration of these ideas. Moore (2002) consideredMemory and Cognition 4 (2015) 229–238
the same two questions, asked in two different orders, within a
Gallup poll. For example, participants were asked the questions
“Do you generally think Bill Clinton is honest and trustworthy?”
and “Do you generally think Al Gore is honest and trustworthy”
in either of two orders. When the Clinton question was ﬁrst, 50%
answered yes, when second 57%. When the Gore question was ﬁrst
and second, the corresponding percentages were 68% and 60%. The
results partly suggest a process of assimilation, whereby the second
question produces an answer which indicates a degree of consis-
tency with the ﬁrst (Moore, 2002). Psychologically, such results are
intuitive. When a question is asked ﬁrst, the person must rely on
knowledge she can retrieve from memory related to the question.
But, if this question is preceded by another one, then the person
will incorporate some of her thoughts retrieved from the previous
question into her answer for the second one (e.g., Schwarz, 2007).
According to CP theory, such order effects are fallacious. Con-
sider two  events, saying ‘yes’ to the Clinton question (Clinton)
and saying ‘yes’ to the Gore question (Gore). Then, the classical
description of the situation is that the probability of saying yes
to Clinton and yes to Gore is the probability of saying yes to
Clinton, followed by the probability of saying yes to Gore, given the
Clinton answer. In other words, we have Prob(Gore|Clinton)·Prob
(Clinton) = Prob(Gore&Clinton) = Prob(Clinton|Gore)·Prob(Gore).
So, classically, it is an error if, across a sample of observers, the
answers to the Clinton, Gore questions produce different probabil-
ities (a classical model can be augmented with order parameters
to numerically accommodate such results, but then the modeling
framework becomes merely descriptive).
A QP model for question order effects (e.g., Wang & Busemeyer,
2013; for a simpliﬁed exposition see Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013)
would assume that the possibilities that Clinton is honest and
Gore is honest are incompatible, but also correlated with each
other. Then, the answer to the two  questions is a quantum con-
junction, so that, depending on order, we  would have either
Prob(Clinton &then Gore) or Prob(Gore &then Clinton). Let us con-
sider the second order. It is assumed that evaluating the Clinton
question in isolation requires that Clinton is not considered par-
ticularly honest. However, having accepted Gore as honest creates
an alternative perspective, from which Clinton appears more hon-
est (because of the relation between the two  candidates). It is as
if the higher honesty of Gore somewhat transfers to a judgment
about Clinton as well. This transfer is possible because Gore and
Clinton would, in general, be perceived fairly similar, since they
ran together.
Applying these QP ideas to the situation of personnel decision
making suggests that, if you are evaluating the performance of Al
and Bill, the rating for each might depend on whom you evaluate
ﬁrst. If you ﬁrst consider Al, you are likely to incorporate some of the
thoughts retrieved about Al into your evaluation of Bill. According
to the QP model for order effects, such inﬂuences are likely to be
generated, when there is some kind of connection between Al and
Bill, for example, perhaps they work on the same team or on similar
tasks. Note that, when a decision simply involves the rank ordering
of two  related options, then such order effects could be less of an
issue. If you had to choose between just Al Gore and Bill Clinton
based on how trustworthy you felt they were (cf. Moore, 2002),
then whichever order you considered, Al Gore would have been
selected. But, suppose additional options are included in the choice
set, for example Lionel Messi, a candidate unrelated to Al Gore or Bill
Clinton, who  is therefore unlikely to inﬂuence the ratings of the two
original candidates. Then, the actual rating of trustworthiness for
each option does matter and so order effects could lead to inferior
decision making, in that a factor irrelevant to the objective quality
of the candidates (here, their order of evaluation) might affect the
choice. For example, suppose that Messi is evaluated at 65%, Gore
at 60%, when he is evaluated ﬁrst, and at 68% when he is evaluated
ch in 
s
o
t
a
f
p
d
t
s
t
e
i
S
a
e
(
a
w
n
a
u
i
s
p
d
i
o
o
a
u
t
6
h
t
d
b
a
H
i
2
s
t
a
o
t
t
m
d
a
s
t
s
b
p
b
C
r
m
c
wL.C. White et al. / Journal of Applied Resear
econd. Clearly, whether Gore receives the top rating now depends
n his assessment order, relative to Clinton.
No research, to the best of our knowledge, applying QP ideas
o personnel evaluation has been carried out, although there are
 number of empirical studies that suggest that QP might be a
ruitful avenue for modeling the cognitive processes underlying
erformance appraisal. Order effects in evaluation are an obvious
irection for further work, but there are other promising direc-
ions as well. For example, in research on the decision making of
election, the so-called decoy effect involves the introduction of a
hird option, which is dominated by only one of an existing pair of
qual options. This can lead to decision makers favoring the dom-
nating option (e.g., Highhouse, 1996; Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982;
laughter, Bagger, & Li, 2006), suggesting interference effects such
s those typical of QP models. Dilution effects, whereby new, appar-
ntly irrelevant information, produces less extreme judgments
Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981), may  also inﬂuence performance
ppraisal (e.g., Reb et al., 2014) and be a good avenue of exploration
ith QP modeling. Furthermore, these types of effects are obviously
ot restricted to personnel decision making, but can equally be
pplied to other types of organizational decisions, such as the eval-
ation of different marketing campaigns for the same product or
n strategic decision making when considering, for example, two
eparate, but related, markets (e.g., Korea and Taiwan). Our main
oint is that, typically, QP based models can plausibly accommo-
ate effects, such as the ones described above and so offer insight
nto the underlying cognitive processes. For example, in the case
f question order effects, the context created by the ﬁrst judgment
r piece of information that is processed alters the cognitive state
nd so interferes with the subsequent judgment; the advantage of
sing a QP model is that it allows a more detailed speciﬁcation of
he underlying representations and processes.
. Intuition, superposition and the constructive nature of
uman judgment
It has been argued that whilst intuition can be fostered
hrough experience, the development of expertise, and complex,
omain relevant schemas, intuitive judgments themselves cannot
e forced. Instead they happen instantaneously and involuntarily
s a response to internal or external stimuli (Dane & Pratt, 2007;
odgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008). Given that intu-
tion is, by its very nature, hard to explain rationally (Dane & Pratt,
007), it might be a good candidate for a QP based approach. In this
ection, we consider a speciﬁc question in relation to intuition: does
he transition from uncertainty about which response is appropri-
te, to the certainty associated with making the response, impact
n the underlying representations?
A common assumption for many formal models used in decision
heory, especially those based on CP theory, is that the cogni-
ive system changes from moment to moment, but at any speciﬁc
oment is considered to be in a deﬁnite state with respect to a
ecision to be made. Using QP theory the situation is different. QP
llows the cognitive system to be in an indeﬁnite or superposition
tate at each moment before the decision is made. This means that
he cognitive system has the potential for any of the possible deci-
ions at each moment in time, but which one is selected cannot
e determined until the system is measured (e.g., the individual
rovides a response). This leads to a second important difference
etween CP and QP theory. According to models based on baseline
P theory, the measurement taken of a system at a given moment
eﬂects the state of the system immediately prior to the measure-
ent. However, in QP theory, taking a measurement of a system
reates rather than records a property of the system (Peres, 1998),
hich means that the subsequent state of the cognitive system isMemory and Cognition 4 (2015) 229–238 235
constructed from the interaction between the superposition state
and the measurement taken (Bohr, 1958).
White, Pothos, & Busemeyer (2013) and White, Pothos, and
Busemeyer (2014) have provided an empirical demonstration of
the inﬂuence that measurement can have on the cognitive system,
using a simple two-step affective ratings task. In the ﬁrst step, a
positive (or negative) image was shown and in the second step
an image made up of a combination of the ﬁrst positive (nega-
tive) image and a negative (positive) image was shown. In a within
subjects, counter balanced design participants rated the same sec-
ond mixed images twice; after rating the ﬁrst (single) image and
after only viewing the ﬁrst image without rating it. This enabled a
within subjects comparison of ratings of the second mixed image,
when participants had seen identical ﬁrst images, presented in an
identical order, with the only difference being the presence of an
intermediate rating for the ﬁrst image or not. Does this interme-
diate rating affect the second one? Baseline prescription from CP
theory tells us that it should not (see also Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992,
for the same prediction, on the basis of an alternative, standard
framework). However, White et al. (2013, 2014) reported that the
intermediate rating led to more negative ratings for the second
image in the positive, negative order and vice versa (i.e., when the
images were presented in a negative, positive order, an intermedi-
ate rating led to more positive ratings for the second image).
Psychologically, such results are not surprising. Several
researchers have argued that making a choice can have a con-
structive inﬂuence, in relation to the underlying preference states.
Simply put, the act of choosing an option can sometimes increase
preference for that option (e.g., Ariely & Norton, 2008; Sharot et al.,
2010; cf. Festinger, 1957). The intuition is that, in some cases, inter-
nal values do not exist. For example, the process of articulating a
preference elaborates the relevant internal states so that, after the
preference, these internal states are no longer the same.
Of course, many classical systems exist, such that making a
choice can alter the relevant internal states. If we restrict ourselves
to CP models, then a baseline assumption is that all uncertainty
is epistemic, but internal values exist (it is just that we do not
know what these values are). Therefore, the process of making
a (non-invasive) measurement on the relevant states is simply
one of reading off the internally existing values. One can certainly
endow CP approaches with mechanisms which allow judgments to
be constructive, but such mechanisms are additional components.
By contrast, according to a QP approach, when the mental state is
a superposition state, then a speciﬁc value for the corresponding
choice or question does not exist. It is only through an act of mea-
surement (e.g., an expression of a preference or decision), that a
value comes to be.
Obviously not all judgments involve a constructive process, as
for many cases there is a previously learnt response, which is simply
retrieved at the point of measurement. However, for those types of
loosely structured, ambiguous situations, which afford more com-
plex, creative judgments, and which are more likely to feature
intuition (e.g., Klein, 1998; Shapiro & Spence, 1997), QP may  be
a more natural method for understanding the cognitive processes
involved in the transition from ambiguity to certainty. Prior to the
decision, in QP terms, the individual is in an uncertain or super-
position state, with respect to the decision being made. QP theory
can provide a theory for the processes and related representations,
as this (superposition) uncertainty is resolved and, more speciﬁ-
cally, provide concrete predictions regarding the way constructive
inﬂuences can arise.7. Concluding comments
Research on decision making in organizations has generated
many different theories and approaches based on heuristics (e.g.,
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igerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), biases (e.g., Kahneman
t al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), and socio-political inﬂu-
nces (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Weick,
995). There is general agreement that these approaches provide
n accurate, ecologically valid, description of decision making in
rganizational and other real-life settings. Nevertheless, many still
rgue that models based on rational analysis and CP theory offer
he best prescription for how decisions should be made. As a result,
escriptive accounts of decision making based on, for example,
euristics, when compared against recommendations based on CP
heory, can appear irrational or inaccurate. In other words, conjunc-
ions between less and more probable events, uncertainty, or other
nterference effects in organizational decision making can lead to
esults which are hard to reconcile with the ‘correct’ predictions
rom CP theory.
Compared with rational analysis and models that use CP theory,
P models have been more frequently shown to be consistent with
escriptive models and theories of organizational decision making.
s it is possible to build normative arguments for QP theory, simi-
ar to those for CP theory (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2014), we suggest
hat, in some cases, QP theory can be used to justify decisions that
ould otherwise be considered fallacious and re-cast them as being
ormally correct (in QP terms).
We stated earlier in this paper that our work so far has been
ocused on evaluating the validity of QP cognitive models, against
ell-known empirical results. Indeed, much of the work in QP
heory has focused on theory development and less attention has
een given to empirical demonstrations. Equally, where empirical
vidence has been gathered, it has focused on laboratory experi-
ents; very little applied work has been carried out (for a notable
xception see Wang, Solloway, Shiffrin, & Busemeyer, 2014). The
bjective of this paper is to explore whether the theoretical or
esearch-oriented success of QP models can translate to implica-
ions for real-life organizational decision making. What have we
earned about real life decision making from the QP cognition pro-
ram? Our approach has been to provide a summary of our current
ork with QP cognitive models and so motivate a range of intuitive
pplications in organizational decision making. In other words, we
ave sought to generalize the lab-based, experimental situations,
gainst which current QP models have been developed, to anal-
gous real-life situations. We  think that the generalizations we
ake are reasonable, nevertheless, at this point, inevitably they
nvolve a fair amount of speculation too. Without direct experi-
ental testing, it would be impossible to settle the case one way
r another.
How might we go about testing some of our ideas in an applied
etting? As reviewed in this paper, QP models can be tested using
ethodologies common to most judgment and decision making
esearch. However, QP models also incorporate process assump-
ions. Thus, experiments that involve sequencing of information
nd varying requirements on timing of decisions could lead to
trong tests of QP models. For example, the in-tray exercise, a man-
gement simulation used in assessment and management training,
nvolves presenting participants with emails and memos  concern-
ng organizational issues and asking them to make decisions about
hose issues. Stimuli can be about different types of issues (e.g.,
trategic, operational, personnel). Stimuli are delivered either all
ogether, where the ability to plan and prioritize is part of the
ssessment or sequentially, over the course of the exercise, so
hat adaptability can be assessed. So, for example, the exercise
ould enable tests of how a prior decision might inﬂuence a sub-
equent decision, as well as how the act of making a decision itself
ight inﬂuence later judgment. Another potential area for test-
ng some of the process assumptions in QP models is the decision
aking of selectors working on an assessment center who, as a
equirement of the assessment center procedures, will experienceMemory and Cognition 4 (2015) 229–238
different sequences in the evaluation of candidates. Business sim-
ulations, a tool used in management development or case studies,
a mainstay of business school education, may  be useful ways of
testing our ideas regarding the conjunction fallacy and law of total
probability. For example, a business opportunity with a variety of
characteristics might be evaluated, with a view to include charac-
teristics which might lead to a conjunction fallacy or ensure the
absence of certain information, so as to produce a violation in the
law of total probability. Such experimental tests present us with an
exciting direction for future research.
A source of optimism regarding this more applied direction of
the QP research program is that the application of QP theory does
not assume representational resources, which, in an applied set-
ting, can be considered unrealistic. In CP theory, it is generally
possible to construct a complete joint probability distribution, for
arbitrary sets of possibilities (Grifﬁths, 2003, calls this the principle
of unicity). But how realistic is this requirement? For example, in
the case of Linda, classically, we  need a complete joint probability
distribution, not just for the properties of being a bank teller and a
feminist, but for any arbitrary combination of properties, including
ones which are rarely encountered together. It is unclear where the
information for these joint probability distributions would come
from. Moreover, there is an issue of computational complexity,
since, for N binary possibilities, speciﬁcation of the complete joint
would require 2N probabilities (and many more for the correspond-
ing marginals). Such complexity may  be beyond the capacity of
the human mind (cf. Simon, 1955). Quantum theory avoids such
problems and so perhaps provides a more natural framework for
modeling human decision making, especially in applied settings.
We  hope that such a priori arguments, together with the directions
we outlined in this paper, will help make the case that the develop-
ment of QP cognitive models is a promising endeavor for modeling
decision making in applied contexts of fairly direct practical signif-
icance.
Conﬂict of interest statement
The authors declare that there are no conﬂicts of interest.
Acknowledgements
E.M.P. was supported by Leverhulme Trust grant RPG-2013-
004 and J.R.B. by NSF grant ECCS-1002188. E.M.P. and J.R.B. were
supported by Air Force Ofﬁce of Scientiﬁc Research (AFOSR), Air
Force Material Command, USAF, grants FA 8655-13-1-3044 and FA
9550-12-1-0397 respectively. The U.S Government is authorized
to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purpose
notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. We  are grateful to
Ulrich Hoffrage and two anonymous reviewers for their construc-
tive and helpful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.
References
Aerts, D. (2009). Quantum structure in cognition. Journal of Mathematical Psychology,
53(5),  314–348. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2009.04.005
Aerts, D., & Aerts, S. (1995). Applications of quantum statistics in psychological
studies of decision processes. Foundations of Science, 1, 85–97.
Aerts, D., & Gabora, L. (2005). A theory of concepts and their combinations II:
A  Hilbert space representation. Kybernetes, 34,  192–221. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1108/03684920510575807
Anderson, J. R. (1991). The adaptive nature of human categorization. Psychological
Review,  98(3), 409–429. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.98.3.409
Ariely, D., & Norton, M.  I. (2008). How actions create – Not just reveal –
Preferences. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 13–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.tics.2007.10.008
Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35(1), 124–140. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/0749-5978(85)90049-4
ch in 
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
D
E
E
E
E
F
F
F
G
G
G
G
G
G
H
H
H
H
HL.C. White et al. / Journal of Applied Resear
tmanspacher, H., & Filk, T. (2010). A proposed test of temporal nonlocal-
ity in bistable perception. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 54, 314–321.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2009.12.001
ar-Anan, Y., Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2009). The feeling of uncertainty
intensiﬁes affective reactions. Emotion, 9(1), 123–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1037/a0014607
asieva, I., & Khrennikov, A. (2014). Complementarity of mental observables. Topics
in  Cognitive Science, 6, 74–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12061
ohr, N. (1928). The quantum postulate and the recent development of atomic
theory. Nature (Supplement), 121, 580–590.
ohr, N. (1958). Atomic physics and human knowledge. New York: Wiley.
ordley, R. (1998). Quantum mechanical and human violations of compound
probability principles: Toward a generalized Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
Operations Research, 46(6), 923–926. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.46.6.923
ordley, R., & Kadane, J. B. (1999). Experiment-dependent priors in psychol-
ogy and physics. Theory and Decision, 47(3), 213–227. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1023/A:1005107029264
ruza, P. D., Kitto, K., Nelson, D., & McEvoy, C. L. (2009). Is there something quantum-
like about the human mental lexicon? Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 53,
362–377. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2009.04.004
usemeyer, J. R., & Bruza, P. (2012). Quantum models of cognition and decision making.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
usemeyer, J. R., Wang, Z., & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. (2009). Comparison of Markov
and quantum models of decision making. Journal of Mathematical Psychology,
53(5),  423–433. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2009.03.002
usemeyer, J. R., Pothos, E., Franco, R., & Trueblood, J. S. (2011). A quantum theoret-
ical  explanation for probability judgment ‘errors’. Psychological Review, 118(2),
193–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0022542
hristensen, C. M.,  & Rosenbloom, R. S. (1995). Explaining the attack-
ers  advantage – Technological paradigms, organizational dynamics, and
the  value network. Research Policy, 24(2), 233–257. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/0048-7333(93)00764-K
roson, R. (1999). The disjunction effect and reason-based choice in games.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 80,  118–133.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1999.2846
yert, R. M.,  & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the ﬁrm. In Englewood Cliffs.
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
ane, E. I., & Pratt, M.  G. (2007). Exploring intuition and its role in managerial
decision-making. Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 33–54.
isenhardt, K. M.,  & Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strate-
gic  Management Journal, 21(10–11), 1105–1121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/
1097-0266(200010/11)21:10/11
isenhardt, K. M., & Zbaracki, M.  J. (1992). Strategic decision making. Strategic Man-
agement Journal, 13,  17–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250130904
llsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of
Economics,  75,  643–669.
pstein, L. G. (1999). A deﬁnition of uncertainty aversion. Review of Economic Studies,
66(3),  579–608. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00099
estinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
inkelstein, S., Whitehead, J., & Campbell, A. (2008). Think again: Why  good leaders
make bad decisions and how to keep it from happening to you. Boston, MA:  Harvard
Business School Press.
ox, C. R., & Tversky, A. (1995). Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 110, 585–603. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2946693
augler, B. B., & Rudolph, A. S. (1992). The inﬂuence of assessed perfor-
mance variation on assessors’ judgments. Personnel Psychology, 45(1), 77–98.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.1992.tb00845.x
igerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond heuris-
tics and biases. In W.  Stroebe, & M.  Hewstone (Eds.), European review of
social psychology (Vol. 2) (pp. 83–115). Chichester: Wiley. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1080/14792779143000033
igerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (Eds.). (2001). Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox.
Cambridge, MA: MIT  Press.
igerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M.  (1999). Fast and frugal heuristics: The adaptive toolbox.
In  G. Gigerenzer, P. M.  Todd, & the ABC Research Group (Eds.), Simple heuristics
that  make us smart (pp. 3–34). New York: Oxford University Press.
ioia, D. A., Schultz, M.,  & Corley, K. G. (2000). Organizational identity, image,
and  adaptive instability. Academy of Management Review, 25(1), 63–81.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/259263
rifﬁths, R. B. (2003). Consistent quantum theory.  Cambridge: University Press.
aslam, S. A., Eggins, R. A., & Reynolds, K. J. (2003). The ASPIRe model: Actu-
alizing social and personal identity resources to enhance organizational
outcomes. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 76,  83–113.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/096317903321208907
ertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The conjunction fallacy revisited: How intelli-
gent inferences look like reasoning errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,
12(4),  275–305.
ighhouse, S. (1996). Context-dependent selection: The effects of decoy and phan-
tom  job candidates. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65(1),
68–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1996.0006
ighhouse, S. (2008). Stubborn reliance on intuition and subjectivity in
employee selection. Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 1(3), 333–342.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9434.2008.00058.x
irsh, J. B., Mar, R. A., & Peterson, J. B. (2012). Psychological entropy: A framework
for  understanding uncertainty-related anxiety. Psychological Review, 119(2),
304–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0026767Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 229–238 237
Hodgkinson, G. P., & Healey, M.  P. (2011). Psychological foundations of dynamic
capabilities: Reﬂexion and reﬂection in strategic management. Strategic Man-
agement Journal, 32,  1500–1516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.964
Hodgkinson, G. P., Langan-Fox, J., & Sadler-Smith, E. (2008). Intuition: A fundamental
bridging construct in the behavioural sciences. British Journal of Psychology,  99,
1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/000712607X216666
Hogarth, R. M.,  & Einhorn, H. J. (1992). Order effects in belief updat-
ing: The belief-adjustment model. Cognitive Psychology, 24,  1–55.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(92)90002-J
Hogg, M.  A. (2000). Subjective uncertainty reduction through self-categorisation: A
motivational theory of social identity process. European Review of Social Psychol-
ogy,  11,  223–255. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14792772043000040
Hogg, M.  A., & Terry, D. J. (2000). Social identity and self-categorization pro-
cesses in organizational contexts. Academy of Management Review,  25(1),
121–140.
Holton, G. (1970). The roots of complementarity. Daedalus, 99(4),
1015–1055.
Howson, C., & Urbach, P. (1993). Scientiﬁc reasoning: The Bayesian approach. Chicago:
Open Court.
Huber, J., Payne, J. W.,  & Puto, C. (1982). Adding asymmetrically dominated
alternatives: Violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis. Journal of
Consumer Research, 9, 90–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/208899
Hughes, R. I. G. (1989). The structure and interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.
Huy, Q. N. (1999). Emotional capability, emotional intelligence, and radical
change. Academy of Management Review, 24(2), 325–345. http://dx.doi.org/
10.2307/259085
Huy, Q. N. (2002). Emotional balancing of organizational continuity and radical
change: The contribution of middle managers. Administrative Science Quarterly,
47,  31–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3094890
Isham, C. J. (1989). Lectures on quantum theory.  Singapore: World Scientiﬁc.
James, W.  (1890a). . The principles of psychology (Vol. 1) New York: Holt.
James, W.  (1890b). . The principles of psychology (Vol. 2) New York: Holt.
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions
and ﬁascoes. Boston, MA:  Houghton Mifﬂin.
Jones, M.,  & Love, B. C. (2011). Bayesian fundamentalism or enlightenment?
On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian
models of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(4), 169–231.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10003134
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The psychology of preferences. Scientiﬁc Amer-
ican,  246(1), 160–173.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological
Review,  103(3), 582–591. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.582
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty:
Heuristics and biases.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Khrennikov, A. Y. (2010). Ubiquitous quantum structure: From psychology to ﬁnance.
New York: Springer. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05101-2
Khrennikov, A. Y., & Haven, E. (2009). Quantum mechanics and viola-
tions of the sure-thing principle: The use of probability interference
and other concepts. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 53(5), 378–388.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2009.01.007
Klein, G. (1998). Sources of power: How people make decisions. Cambridge, MA:  MIT
Press.
Klein, G. (2003). Intuition at work. New York: Bantem Dell.
Kurtz, J. L., Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2007). Quantity versus uncertainty: When
winning one prize is better than winning two. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology,  43,  979–985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2006.10.020
Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., Zamir, S., & Zwirn, H. (2009). Type indeterminacy: A model
of  the KT (Kahneman-Tversky)-man. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 53(5),
349–361. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2009.01.001
Langley, A. (1995). Between ‘paralysis by analysis’ and ‘extinction by instinct’. Sloan
Management Review, 36(3), 63–76.
Lawless, W.  F., & Grayson, J. M.  (2003). A quantum perturbation model (QPM)  of
knowledge fusion and organizational mergers. In L. van Elst, V. Dignum, & A.
Abecker (Eds.), Agent-mediated knowledge management (pp. 143–161). Berlin:
Springer.
Lawless, W.  F., & Sofge, D. A. (2012). Social-psychological harmonic oscillators in the
self-regulation of organizations and systems. In J. R. Busemeyer, F. Dubois, A.
Lambert-Mogiliansky, & M.  Melucci (Eds.), Quantum interaction: 6th international
symposium, QI 2012. Lecture notes in computer science (Vol. 7620) (pp. 227–238).
Springer.
Lawless, W.  F., Bergman, M.,  Louc¸ ã, J., Kriegel, N. N., & Feltovich, N. (2007). A quan-
tum  metric of organizational performance: Terrorism and counterterrorism.
Computational & Mathematical Organizational Theory,  13,  241–281.
Lawless, W.  F., Angjellari-Dajci, F., Sofge, D. A., Grayson, J., Sousa, J. L., & Rychly,
L.  (2011). A new approach to organizations: Stability and transformation
in  dark social networks. Journal of Enterprise Transformation, 1, 290–322.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19488289.2011.623029
Lewin, K. (1951). Field theory in social science. New York: Harper & Row.
March, J. G. (1997). Understand how decisions happen in organizations. In Z. Shapira
(Ed.), Organizational decision making (pp. 9–32). Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley.
Marewski, J. R., & Schooler, L. J. (2011). Cognitive niches: An ecologi-
cal  model of strategy selection. Psychological Review,  118(3), 393–437.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0024143
2 ch in 
M
M
M
N
N
N
N
O
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
R
R
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
Yukalov, V. I., & Sornette, D. (2009). Processing information in quantum decision38 L.C. White et al. / Journal of Applied Resear
iller, D., & Friesen, P. H. (1980). Momentum and revolution in orga-
nizational adaptation. Academy of Management Journal, 23(4), 591–614.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/255551
intzberg, H., Raisinghani, D., & Theoret, A. (1976). Structure of unstruc-
tured decision-processes. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(2), 246–275.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2392045
oore, D. W.  (2002). Measuring new types of question-order effects. Public Opinion
Quarterly,  66(1), 80–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/338631
ewell, A. (1990). Uniﬁed theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
iedenthal, P. M.,  Barsalou, L. W.,  Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, F.
(2005). Embodiment in attitudes, social perception, and emotion. Person-
ality and Social Psychology Review, 9(3), 184–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/
s15327957pspr0903 1
ielsen, M.  A., & Chuang, I. L. (2010). Quantum computation and quantum information.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
isbett, R. E., Zukier, H., & Lemley, R. E. (1981). The dilution effect: Nondiagnos-
tic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information. Cognitive
Psychology,  13(2), 248–277.
aksford, M., & Chater, N. (2009). Précis of Bayesian rationality: The probabilis-
tic  approach to human reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32,  69–120.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09000284
almer, J. K., Maurer, T. J., & Feldman, J. M.  (2002). Context and prior
impression effects on attention, judgment standards, and ratings: Contrast
effects revisited. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32(12), 2575–2597.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2002.tb02757.x
ayne, J. W.,  Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, J. (1993). The adaptive decision maker.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
eres, A. (1998). Quantum theory: Concepts and methods. Kluwer Academic.
feffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Cambridge, MA:  Ballinger.
othos, E. M.,  & Busemeyer, J. R. (2009). A quantum probability explanation for vio-
lations of ‘rational’ decision theory. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences,  276(1665), 2171–2178. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2009.0121
othos, E. M.,  & Busemeyer, J. R. (2013). Can quantum probability provide a new
direction for cognitive modeling? Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 36,  255–327.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12001525
othos, E. M.,  & Busemeyer, J. R. (2014). In search for a standard of rationality. Fron-
tiers in Cognitive Science, 5, 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00049
othos, E. M., Busemeyer, J. R., & Trueblood, J. S. (2013). A quantum
geometric model of similarity. Psychological Review, 120(3), 679–696.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0033142
eb, J., Greguras, G. J., Luan, S., & Daniels, M.  A. (2014). Performance appraisals as
heuristic judgments under uncertainty. In S. Highhouse, R. S. Dalal, & E. Salas
(Eds.), Judgment and decision making at work (pp. 13–36). New York: Routledge.
eger, R. K., Gustafon, L. T., Demarie, S. M.,  & Mullane, J. V. (1994). Refram-
ing  the organization: Why  implementing total quality is easier said than
done. Academy of Management Review, 19(3), 565–584. http://dx.doi.org/10.
5465/AMR.1994.9412271815
avage, L. J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New-York: Wiley.
chwarz, N. (2007). Attitude construction: Evaluation in context. Social Cognition,
25,  638–656. http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2007.25.5.638
haﬁr, E., & Tversky, A. (1992). Thinking through uncertainty: Noncon-
sequential reasoning and choice. Cognitive Psychology, 24,  449–474.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(92)90015-T
hapiro, S., & Spence, M.  T. (1997). Managerial intuition: A conceptual and opera-
tional framework. Business Horizons, 40(1), 63–68.
harot, T., Velasquez, C. M.,  & Dolan, R. J. (2010). Do decisions shape prefer-
ence? Evidence from blind choice. Psychological Science, 21(9), 1231–1235.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797610379235
imon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics,  69,  99–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1884852
imon, H. A. (1979). Rational decision making in business organizations. American
Economic Review, 69(4), 494–513.
laughter, J. E., Bagger, J., & Li, A. (2006). Context effects on group-based employee
selection decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
100(1), 47–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.01.003
taw, B. M. (1976). Knee-deep in the big muddy: A study of escalating commitment
to  a chosen course of action. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,
16(1),  27–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(76)90005-2Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 229–238
Staw, B. M.,  & Ross, J. (1987). Behavior in escalation situations: Antecedents, proto-
types, and solutions. Research in Organizational Behavior, 9, 39–78.
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic manage-
ment. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509–533. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/
(SICI)1097-0266(199708)18:7
Tenenbaum, J. B., Kemp, C., Grifﬁths, T. L., & Goodman, N. (2011). How to grow
a  mind: Statistics, structure, and abstraction. Science, 331(6022), 1279–1285.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1192788
Tetlock, P. E. (1985). Accountability: The neglected social context of judgment and
choice. In L. L. Cummings, & B. M.  Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior
(pp. 297–332). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Thorsteinson, T. J., Breier, J., Atwell, A., Hamilton, C., & Privette, M.  (2008). Anchoring
effects on performance judgments. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes,  107, 29–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.01.003
Trueblood, J. S., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2011). A quantum probability account of order
effects in inference. Cognitive Science, 35(8), 1518–1552. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01197.x
Tushman, M., & Anderson, P. (1986). Technological discontinuities and orga-
nizational environments. Administrative Science Quarterly,  31(3), 439–465.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2392832
Tushman, M.,  & Romanelli, E. (1985). Organizational evolution: A metamorphosis
model of convergence and reorientation. In L. L. Cummings, & B. M.  Staw (Eds.),
Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 7) (pp. 171–222). Greenwich, CT: JAI
Press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The con-
junction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90(4), 293–315.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.90.4.293
Van Rijsbergen, K. (2004). The geometry of information retrieval. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511543333
Wakker, P. P. (2010). Prospect theory for risk and ambiguity.  Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511779329
Wang, Z., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2013). A quantum question order model supported by
empirical tests of an a priori and precise prediction. Topics in Cognitive Science,
5(4)  http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12040
Wang, Z., Busemeyer, J. R., Atmanspacher, H., & Pothos, E. M.  (2013). The potential of
using quantum theory to build models of cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science,
5(4)  http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12043
Wang, Z., Solloway, T., Shiffrin, R. M.,  & Busemeyer, J. R. (2014). Con-
text effects produced by question orders reveal quantum nature of
human judgments. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1407756111
Weary, G., & Edwards, J. A. (1996). Causal-uncertainty beliefs and related goal struc-
tures. In R. M.  Sorrentino, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and
cognition: The interpersonal context (Vol. 3) (pp. 148–181). New York: Guilford
Press.
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sense making in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Wheeler, M.  (2005). Reconstructing the cognitive world: The next step. Cambridge, MA:
MIT  Press.
White, L. C., Pothos, E. M.,  & Busemeyer, J. R. (2013). A quantum probability per-
spective on the nature of psychological uncertainty. In M.  Knauff, M.  Pauen, N.
Sebanz, & I. Wachsmuth (Eds.), Proceedings of the 35th annual conference of the
cognitive science society (pp. 1599–1604). Austin TX: Cognitive Science Society.
White, L. C., Pothos, E. M.,  & Busemeyer, J. R. (2014). Sometimes it does hurt to
ask:  The constructive role of articulating impressions. Cognition, 133(1), 48–64.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.05.015
Widdows, D. (2004). Geometry and meaning. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Wilson, T. D., Centerbar, D. B., Kermer, D. A., & Gilbert, D. T. (2005). The pleasures
of  uncertainty: Prolonging positive moods in ways people do not antici-
pate. Attitudes and Social Cognition, 88(1), 5–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
0022-3514.88.1.5
Yukalov, V. I., & Sornette, D. (2008). Quantum decision theory as quantum the-
ory of measurement. Physics Letters A, 372(46), 6867–6871. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.physleta.2008.09.053theory. Entropy, 11(4), 1073–1120. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e11041073
Yukalov, V. I., & Sornette, D. (2012). Quantum decision making by social agents, Swiss
Finance Institute. Research Paper No. 12-10, February 2012 http://dx.doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.2018270
